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The decision to migrate has received substantial attention from both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives.  Underlying most analyses is the desire to understand why 
individuals relocate within their own country, or more drastically, migrate to another 
country.  While there are numerous reasons to migrate, economists have focused their 
research on the notion that there are gains to be made from migration: ceteris paribus, 
migrants are expected to earn more than non-migrants (Todaro, 1989).  This paper 
utilizes a rich data set from Peru to assess the determinants of migration.  We find that, 
when controlling for self-selection, migrants do not earn more than “stayers.” 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The decision to migrate has received substantial attention from both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives.  Underlying most analyses is the desire to understand why individuals relocate 
within their own country, or more drastically, migrate to another country.  While there are 
numerous reasons to migrate, economists have focused their research on the notion that there are 
gains to be made from migration: ceteris paribus, migrants are expected to earn more than non-
migrants (Todaro, 1989).
1  Consequently, the determination of the earnings differential between 
migrants and non-migrants has occupied the bulk of the research agenda.   
Recent empirical work on explaining the earnings differential has emphasized the need to 
control for the standard problems of self-selection (Borjas, 1990; Pessino, 1991; Lanzona, 1998; 
Tunali, 2000 and Ham, Li and Reagan (2003)).  That is, since migrant households may have 
different levels of human capital, or unobservable characteristics that are correlated to higher 
earnings, failure to control for such individual level heterogeneity may lead to erroneous 
conclusions regarding the returns to migration.  The empirical techniques utilized in such studies 
follow methodologies laid out, in particular, by Heckman (1974, 1976, 1978) and Lee (1978, 
1979).  The empirical strategy must therefore account for the fact that individuals sort themselves 
into migrant, non-migrant status based upon their expected earnings given their move status.  The 
probability that an individual migrates is then estimated by reduced form methods and the 
resulting “propensity” score utilized to adjust a subsequent earnings equation.  In this way, the 
propensity to migrate estimate can be used to control for the unobserved heterogeneity of 
migrants.  This is the strategy utilized by Ham, Li and Reagan (2003) in their analysis of the 
impact of migration on wages.  In our study, we compare standard instrumental variable and 
propensity score matching techniques in our analysis of the returns to migration. 
                                                 
1 There are numerous other reasons why individuals may migrate.  Risk diversification, familial 
obligations, the desire to leave tradition-bound localities or relocation owing to civil strife or natural 
disasters figure prominently in recent theoretical studies.  See Carillo et al (1999) for a recent survey. 
 
  1We follow the literature in addressing these issues in order to test the following hypothesis: 
do migrants earn more than non-migrants conditional on migration.  This paper utilizes a rich data 
set from Peru to assess the determinants of migration and which groups benefit most from 
migration relative to ‘stayers’.  In particular, the effects of market failure on migration are 
explored: households’ migration behaviour may be affected by borrowing constraints.  Few 
papers have drawn a link between migration and credit constraints.  Since much of the labour 
force in developing countries is engaged in some form of self-employment labour, credit 
constraints should not be considered independently of the migration decision.  Rapoport (2002) 
and Mesnard (2004) argue that credit constraints are a determining factor in occupational choice 
and, since the migration decision is linked to occupational choice, their results imply a direct 
relationship between credit constraints and migration.  We contribute to this small literature by 
investigating both directions of causality: the effect of credit constraint on migration as well as 
the effect of migration on access to credit.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 outlines the empirical model and some econometric 
issues.  Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents regression results.  Section 5 discusses 
and provides some preliminary results of matching methods.  Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2 AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF THE RETURNS TO MIGRATION 
The primary question facing economists regarding migration behaviour is whether there are 
returns to migration.  Conceptually, it is possible to estimate the return to migration by comparing 
the present discounted earnings of the individual before migration to the present discounted 
earnings of the individual after migration, adjusting for the costs of migration.  Individuals will 
choose to migrate if the net expected earnings from migration are positive. An alternative, yet 
related, conceptualization of this relationship can be represented by equation (1): 
i i i u M Y + + = γ β Xi      (1) 
  2where  are the individual i’s earnings, i indexing over all individuals (migrant and non-migrant), 
represent a vector of individual controls (such as individual characteristics, demographics, 
schooling and other controls correlated to the individual’s earnings),   is a dummy variable 
indicating whether individual i is a migrant, and  is an unobservable error component of the 
individual’s earnings.  The disturbance term,  , is for the moment assumed to be normally 







There are, however, a number of issues that may cause the estimation of equation (1) to yield 
biased estimates of the returns to migration.  The issue of primary concern in this paper is the 
likely endogeneity of migration.  If there is a pay-off to migration, then equation (1) yields a 
positive estimate of γ : the act of migration has in itself caused the individual to experience 
higher earnings.  However, individuals with higher earnings are more likely to migrate since they 
are more able to overcome the fixed costs of migration.  Consequently, it is not clear in which 
direction the causation works. 
In addition, it may be difficult to empirically consider migration independent of earnings.  In 
answering whether the individual is made better off by migrating (as proxied by the return to 
migration, γ ), it is possible the individual migrated because the migrant expected his wages to be 
higher.  This paper attempts to correct for this source of endogeneity by utilizing a two stage least 
squares approach with instrumental variables. 
First, consider the individual’s migration decision.  As discussed above, the decision to 
migrate is not an exogenous event for the individual.  The individual’s decision to migrate will be 
correlated with individual characteristics (such as age, gender, household size, occupation and 
education) and a number of other correlates which may not be in and of themselves directly 
  3correlated with that individual’s labour market earnings.
2  Equation (2) represents the individual’s 
migration process: 
i i v M + = α Zi       ( 2 )  
The vector  includes the variables in vector   as well as a vector of instrumental variables 
 which are correlated to the decision to migrate but which are a priori uncorrelated with the 
error term in the individual earnings regression in (1).   
i Z i X
i IV
A candidate instrument for migration is the expected relative pay-off to moving relative to 
staying.  An individual may decide to migrate if he or she sees that the earnings of her neighbours 
who have migrated are higher than the earnings of her neighbours who have stayed.  Let us define 
mbi Y to be the mean earnings of all individuals (other than individual i) who have migrated away 
from birth place b. Then let  sbi Y  be the mean earnings of all individuals (other than individual i) 
born in birth place b, and who have not migrated.  Furthermore, let us define  bi Y as the ratio 
sbi mbi Y Y .  From the perspective of the potential mover,  bi Y  may proxy as the anticipated 
earnings premium of migration, or the anticipated relative payoff of migration.  Theoretically, 
there is no ex ante reason to expect that  bi Y , which represent averages over all other individuals, 
is correlated to the individual’s actual earnings. Intuitively, the individual migrates if and only if 
this individual anticipates higher earnings, once we control for all other possible correlates, 
including the costs of migration.   
The estimation procedure is a two stage least squares with instrumental variables procedure 
as follows.  Using the instrument discussed above ( bi Y ), we estimate the first stage equation (2).  
                                                 
2 Examples of such correlates are the costs of migration and the individual’s anticipated – not actual – 
return. 
 
  4From the estimation of equation (2), we obtain predicted migration  .  We then substitute   




i i i u M Y + + = ˆ γ β Xi      (3) 
The first stage, using  bi Y  as an instrument for migration, in and of itself provides us with useful 
insightful information regarding what is actually driving individuals to move.  We, of course, 
anticipate that the effect of  bi Y  to be positively correlated with  : the larger the difference 
between the earnings of the neighbours which have migrated and the earnings of the neighbours 
that have stayed, the more likely the individual may think that it will payoff for her to move as 
well.  Additionally, this instrument provides us with a consistency check: should we observe 
i M
1 < bi Y , then any prediction for migration other than Mi=0 may suggest that individuals are 
migrating for reasons other than earnings. 
Technically, this strategy would require that we observe  bi Y  at the precise moment that the 
individual chooses to migrate.  Unfortunately, the data employed in this paper does not provide 
such detailed information.  The contention arises since average earnings are changing over time; 
however, this only causes a problem in the event that there are regional differences in the growth 
of average earnings (that is, if  mbi Y  grows at a rate different than  sbi Y ).  Given the limitations of 
cross-sectional household surveys such as the one utilized here, careful treatment of these 
regional effects will be difficult to conduct other than by simply including regional fixed effects.  
In other words, the empirical analysis that follows will also test model (3) with the following 
error structure, as a sensitivity analysis: 
b i ib i v v ε η + = =      (4) 
In equation (4),  i η  represents the individual specific error term and  b ε  represents the ‘place of 
birth’ fixed effect.   
  5Other Concerns 
It is likely that there is a selection effect that may yield an upward bias to the returns to 
migration: individuals who migrate may simply have a higher propensity to migrate than stayers, 
all else constant, and a positive estimate for γ  may simply be picking up the possibility that this 
innate higher propensity to migrate is correlated with the individual’s ability to earn higher 
earnings.  However, this bias should only be problematic in the case that we are not able to 
control for this innate ability with the observable variables.  This paper presumes that the 
propensity to migrate is picked up by the observable individual characteristics in   and  .  
Many conventional unobservable characteristics are in fact observable given the rich nature of the 
data set. 
i X i Z
 
Migration and Credit 
There is considerable difficulty in assessing a priori the likelihood that an individual who 
migrates has differential access to credit.  The interaction between migration and credit can be 
considered from two perspectives: the impact of credit on the ability to migrate and the ability of 
an individual, after migrating, to access credit. Each will be considered in turn.  If the process of 
migration entails a significant fixed cost, then it is reasonable to assume that migrants, in 
overcoming these costs, are less credit constrained than stayers.  That is, migrants were able to 
save the necessary funds to migrate (and therefore are more likely to have fixed assets for 
collateral purposes) or, if liquidity constrained, were able to access credit to overcome that 
constraint.  In either case, migrants should be less credit constrained than stayers (see also 
Mesnard (2004) and Rapoport (2002)). 
The impact of migration on credit, however, is less clear.  If credit markets in less developed 
countries rely heavily on informal methods to assess credit history (in order to overcome the 
problems of asymmetric information in the absence of collateral), then stayers should have a 
  6relative advantage over migrants.  This is simply due to the fact that stayers have already 
established reputations, networks and other forms of “social capital” that can be utilized to access 
credit.  Conversely, migrants should be at a considerable disadvantage with respect to these 
characteristics and thus are less likely to be able to access both formal and informal forms of 
credit.  However, this relative disadvantage in terms of credit access may be mitigated by the 
nature of migrants themselves.  First, since migrants were able to incur the fixed cost associated 
with migration, this would imply that they, as a group, possess the ability to accumulate the 
necessary funds to migrate or gain access to such funds from credit markets.  Likewise, if 
migrants are a self-selected group, they would have those characteristics, both observable and 
unobservable, that would enable them to generate contacts, social networks and other forms of 
social capital that would allow them to have greater access to credit markets.
3  In sum, it is most 
likely the case that migrants have greater access to credit than stayers, given the former’s proven 
ability to overcome the costs associated with migration. Furthermore, as a self-selected group of 
motivated individuals, migrants are more able to generate the contacts and social ties that play an 




The primary source of data utilized in our analysis is a nationally representative household 
survey from Peru conducted by the Instituto Cuánto with technical and financial assistance from 
the World Bank.  The survey is the 1991 round of the Peruvian Living Standards Survey (PLSS) 
and covers a multitude of topics from education, migration and health to labour market 
information for up to three jobs, non-farm self-employment business operations and agricultural 
production.  The survey sampled 2,308 households from various regions, including 585 rural 
                                                 
3 One would also expect that the initial reputational disadvantage associated with migration would dissipate 
with time. 
  7households.
4  The average household consists of 5 to 6 members currently residing in the same 
dwelling, such that more than 11,000 individuals are represented in the 1991 PLSS.
5  More 
complete information regarding this data set is found in World Bank (1991a, b), Grosh and 
Glewwe (1995).   
 
Migration 
Respondents were asked to report their migratory history for all household members aged 15 
and above.  Migration is a common aspect of the Peruvian economy.  Almost half of all surveyed 
individuals reported having migrated at least once.  At a more aggregated level, almost three 
quarters of all surveyed households contain at least one migrant among their members.  Though a 
complete migration history is not available, the 1991 PLSS does provide information on the place 
of birth, on the reasons for leaving the place of birth and on the details of the last migratory event.  
In addition to standard migration analyses, this information permits an investigation of both the 
geographic direction of migrants as well as motives for migration. 
Table 1 presents means for the direction of migration and reasons for first leaving the place of 
birth.  Of all migrants, 21 percent returned to their place of birth.
6  Of the remaining 79 percent, 
most migrants currently live in an urban area with a large proportion in Metropolitan Lima.  
Nonetheless, over 10 percent of migrants never returning to their place of birth has migrated to 
rural areas.  Table 1 provides some indication of heterogeneity in terms of the direction of 
migration and indicates that migration from rural areas to the metropolitan centre (in this case 
Lima), the traditional study group for internal migration issues, only accounts for less than one 
quarter of all migration. 
                                                 
4 Some departments in the Sierra and the Selva (Amazon jungle) were excluded from the study because of 
their remoteness or terrorist activities. 
5 ‘Current’ refers to the time of the survey. 
6 Unfortunately, the data are not informative regarding the migratory history of this group so that where 
these people have moved to is unknown to the researcher. 
 
  8The reasons for first leaving the place of birth vary depending on whether the individual has 
returned to the place of birth.  Migrants returning to their home province are more likely to have 
left for employment reasons than those who have never returned.  The largest single reason for 
migration remains employment in either case.  The striking result in this table is the large number 
of respondents reporting ‘other’ as their primary reason for migration.  Given the political tension 
in the early 90s, it is possible that respondents were reluctant to specify the exact reason for 
having migrated.
7  Other major reasons reported for migration are ‘education’, ‘more income’ and 
‘marriage’. 
 
Individual and Household Characteristics 
Table 2 provides the means of the variables used in the empirical analysis to follow.  The data 
is split into different samples according to their migratory behaviour.  The first column provides 
the means for all individuals.  Stayers and migrants are presented in the second and third 
columns.  The last two columns split the sample of all migrants into those who have returned to 
their birthplace (‘return migrants’) and those who have not (‘settled migrants’).  For reasons that 
are explained when we discuss our instrument, we keep only observations for which the 
individual’s place of birth (defined as the province for the rural sample and the department for the 
urban sample) is included in the PLSS. 
Comparing the first two columns, we find interesting patterns between migrants and non-
migrants (‘stayers’).  Since a majority of migrants leave their birthplace for employment reasons, 
it is not surprising to find that migrants have a higher participation rate in ‘work for pay’ than 
stayers.  Individuals are considered to work for pay if they either work for a wage or are self-
                                                 
7 In fact, it is possible that the wording of the category ‘terrorism’ is too restrictive: the era of the Shining 
Path and counter-revolutionary activity was more widely known as la violencia, and not terrorismo, 
especially in the Andes. 
 
  9employed.  Excluded from this definition are individuals who do not receive any compensation 
for their labour and do not work for the family business. 
Mean individual earnings of those working for pay are comparable among migrants and 
stayers.  However, migrants are more likely to currently be involved in non-farm self-
employment than stayers.
8  These differences become much more pronounced when we split the 
sample of migrants into return and settled migrants.  Return migrants are far more likely to work 
for pay than stayers.  However, those actually working receive the same earnings on average in 
both groups.  Earnings of settled migrants, on the other hand, are higher than for any other group.  
Return migrants are more likely to be engaged in farming, reflecting the high likelihood that they 
currently reside in rural areas. 
Educational patterns are similar across samples.  However, return migrants have the highest 
mean completed years of formal schooling, suggesting that some of the human capital, perhaps 
acquired in the cities, returns to the area of origin.
9  In contrast, settled migrants have higher 
average household years of schooling than any of the other samples.  Since the majority of settled 
households currently reside in urban areas, the observed educational gap between categories of 
migrants may simply reflect the urban composition of the four samples. 
The independent variables of primary interest are income and access to credit.  The survey 
specifically asks the respondents whether they currently have access to credit.  Though the 
numbers are small relative to the entire sample, migrants have more access to credit than stayers 
(irrespective of whether this credit is considered formal or not).  Unfortunately, the 1991 PLSS 
does not provide information on whether individuals had access to credit prior to the migration 
event.  Since access is thus only observed at the time of the survey, the fact that migrants have 
                                                 
8 Non-farm self-employment includes all activities that do not produce raw agricultural or livestock goods 
and services, and includes all individuals who work for their own account or in the family business.  For 
additional details on non-farm self-employment in the 1991 PLSS see Laszlo (forthcoming). 
9 In fact, almost 17% of migrants from rural areas cited education as the reason for migration in the 1991 
PLSS. 
 
  10more access to credit than stayers may indicate an endogenous relationship between borrowing 
constraints and migration.  Indeed the causal direction is unclear.  On the one hand, the individual 
may have certain characteristics correlated with the decision to migrate that are also correlated 
with having access to credit.  In this case, if these characteristics are time invariant, then it 
possible that these individuals would have qualified for credit prior to the migration event, and so 
may have been less credit constrained in their migration decision.  On the other hand, individuals 
may have chosen to migrate to areas where credit is more easily acquired.  To circumvent the lack 
of information about credit constraints at the time of migration, we utilize the proportion of 
households in the place of residence (province in rural areas or department in urban areas) with 
access to credit.  If the relative geographic distribution in the changes in access to markets is 
time-invariant, this solution should work reasonably well. 
Table 2 shows that most credit sources are informal: individuals are most likely to borrow 
from another individual or a business than through more formal mechanisms such as banks or 
cooperativas.
10  These patterns are common to all types of migrants and stayers:  the most 
important source of credit for all individuals is from another individual, followed by a business, 
and only then from the formal banking sector.  Migrants tend to have more access to credit 
(formal or informal) than stayers: they may have stronger social ties to their communities or may 
simply have more collateral.   
Earnings of migrants of their households are higher than those of stayers.  In particular, 
settled migrants have higher earnings than return migrants.  Several hypotheses present 
themselves to explain this pattern.  First, since the majority of settled migrants currently reside in 
urban areas, their higher earnings may simply be picking up a rural versus urban fixed effect: 
urban wages are larger than rural wages.  Second, return migrants may have returned to their 
                                                 
10 Informal banks (banca paralela) accounts for less than one percent of informal borrowing. 
  11birthplace because they have not succeeded in their migration experience.
11  Third, though related 
to the second point, settled migrants may be successful in their migration for the same reasons 
that they are successful in the labour market.  In other words, individuals who have a high 
propensity of success in the formal labour market self-selected themselves into the group of 
settled migrants.  These reasons may be either observed (such as education) or unobserved (such 
as ability).
12  The empirical section that follows shall disentangle many of these effects. 
In summary, the preliminary evidence provided by the descriptive statistics show that there 
are substantial differences in outcomes and characteristics of different types of migrants.   The 
next section applies the model outlined in section 2 in order to determine whether much of these 
observed differences can be explained by differences in borrowing constraints and endogenous 
migration. 
 
Constructing the instrument – Expected Returns 
The variable that we propose to instrument for migration is the expected earnings gain for the 
migrant.  Recalling the discussion in section 2 above, we construct the expected earnings as the 
ratio of the average earnings of those individuals who have migrated from the birthplace to the 
average earnings of the individuals who have remained in the place of birth.  Intuitively, the 
individual will look at the average earnings of the villagers who have moved away (assuming, of 
course, that he is able to observe these – an assumption that is plausible if the migrant maintains 
                                                 
11 This effect is reported in Pessino (1991).  More intuitively, rural individuals may have migrated to Lima 
in search of employment or higher wages but were unsuccessful and so had no recourse but to return to 
their rural homes. 
12 ‘Return’ migration is only related to this success versus failure hypothesis if the ex-ante migration 
decision was a permanent one.  It remains possible that return migration results from an ex-ante decision to 
temporarily migrate.  For example, children may be sent to school in the city with the understanding that 
they return to their rural homes.  Additionally, living in the city for a few years may be considered a rite of 
passage, and migrants return to their birthplace with a higher social standing as a result of their ‘urban’ 
experience.  
  12social and family ties in the village) and compare that to the average village earnings.
13  If this 
individual observes a significant difference between the two, then he may consider migration if 
he views this difference as being the expected return of migration.  Consequently, we expect that 
the individual is more likely to migrate if he observes a ratio larger than one than if the ratio is 
less than or equal to one. 
Table 3 provides some evidence that the observed pattern between migration behaviour and 
the magnitude of the instrument is consistent with the prediction mentioned above.  Individuals 
whose expected return (as measured by the ratio of average earnings of migrants to the average 
earnings of stayers) is less than or equal to one have a rate of migration of 16.7%.  Those who 
instead observe a ratio greater than one have a rate of migration of 24.6%.  In addition, for 75% 
of observations, the ratio itself is larger than one.  The interpretation is as predicted:  those who 
observe a higher expected return are more likely to migrate than those whose expected returns are 
negative.  The fact that 16.7% migrate if the ratio is less than one may represent individuals who 
migrate for reasons other than earning or, more broadly, for reasons not related to labour 
markets.
14
Several caveats must be highlighted.  First, while it is possible that the 16.7% of migrants 
whose ratio is less than or equal to one have migrated for reasons not related to the labour market, 
it is also possible that they were not able observe the actual ratio as precisely as we (the 
researchers) are.  The surveyors have access to earnings information that is confidential, thus it is 
possible, and likely in many cases, that this is information unknown to the individual.  
Nonetheless, we are confident that this information is a reasonable proxy for the ratio actually 
                                                 
13 In fact, it is often the case, at least in some parts of the central Andes, that a migrant who has ‘made it 
big’ in the city temporarily returns to the village to host a ‘fiesta’ to show off his wealth by redistributing 
some of it during the fiesta. 
14 Recall from Table 1 that only 6.86% of all migrants have migrated for more income, and only 22.7% 
have migrated for employment reasons. 
 
  13observed by individuals.
15  Second, the construction of this variable relies on the place of birth.  If 
a particular place of birth is located in a province or department that has not been surveyed in the 
PLSS, then the construction for the ratio will be impossible for this birthplace.  For this reason, 
we have ‘dropped’ from the analysis all observations in which migrants have were born in a 
region that was not surveyed in the 1991 round of the PLSS.  Recall from table 2 that the 
resulting sample of migrants is similar in means to the settled migrant group that includes all 
observations.  Thirdly, and more worrisome, is the jurisdictional identification of the birthplace.  
For rural individuals (either born in or currently residing in a rural area), it is possible to identify 
the province of birth.
16  However, the urban identification is more complicated.  If an individual 
currently resides in an urban area, the survey identifies the department of residence, but not the 
actual city (with the exception of metropolitan Lima-Callao).  In other words, the instrument is at 
the provincial level for rural dwellers but at the department level for urban residents.  Intuitively, 
this is not likely to cause a problem:  there are few large cities in each of Peru’s 25 departments 
and urban dwellers are more likely to look at the ‘city’ wage than a more disaggregated wage.  
Finally, table 4 provides the first moments of the variables that are included in the empirical 
analysis presented next in section 4.  The most striking aspect in table 4 pertains to the 
instrument.  The mean is 1.8, meaning that, on average, the mean earnings of migrants born in 
region (province or department) b is 1.8 times the mean earnings of those who have stayed in 
region (province or department) b.  This ratio is bounded by 0.299 to 6.598 in the sample.  
 
4 OLS AND IV RESULTS 
The estimated model for earnings (equation (1) in section 2), not corrected for endogenous 
migration, is presented in table 5.  The OLS regression includes weights by household size in 
                                                 
15 Ideally, we would want to have the difference of observed earnings at the time that the migration 
decision is made.  However, the data required to do this in our case is not available. 
16 A province in Peru is a jurisdictional level below that of a department which itself is below that of the 
country as a whole.  A province then includes a number of districts and populated centres and villages. 
  14order to control for household specific heteroscedasticity.  The standard errors reported in this 
procedures are also Huber-White corrected to account for any potential remaining sources of 
heteroscedasticity.  Migrants have higher earnings, on average, than non-migrants, as suggested 
by the positive and significant coefficient on the migration dummy variable.  Age is positively 
related to earnings, but at a decreasing rate, consistent with the standard life-cycle interpretation 
of earnings.  Men make on average more than women, a trend common to most countries, but is 
particularly acute in Peru.  Education is positively related to the individual’s earnings. 
Whether the household is engaged in farm self-employment positively affects the individual’s 
earnings, while if the household is engaged in farm-wage employment, then the estimated effect 
is negative.
17  Intuitively, farm self-employment ventures may be more lucrative occupations and 
farm wage-employment occupations are not.  Since this sample includes a large urban 
component, the farm self-employment ventures are most likely larger operations than the 
subsistence farm and the farm wage-employment is often some form of piece-rate work.  These 
relative occupations at the household level may have direct effects on the individual earnings (for 
instance, in this case, whether the individual is actually working in the household’s farm self-
employment venture), or through spillover effects.
18  The analysis that follows will attempt to 
determine whether these migration estimates (which suggest a positive return to migration) are 
resulting from an endogeneity bias.  The credit constraint effect, captured by the coefficient on 
the percentage of households in the place of birth who have access to credit, is statistically 
insignificant.  Household size and the average years of household schooling (for adults) are 
included to capture the household human capital that may spillover to the individual’s earnings 
profile.
19   
                                                 
17 Note that these dummy variables are not mutually exclusive – a household may operate a non-farm self-
employment venture concurrently with running a farm. 
18 See Laszlo (forthcoming) for an in-depth discussion of these effects and their interpretations. 
19 See Basu et al. (2001) and Laszlo (forthcoming) for a discussion of this spillover effect. 
  15To account for the potentially important regional effects, fixed effects models are also 
estimated.  First, current place (province or department) of residence fixed effects are included.  
Comparing to the OLS estimates, this fixed effects model produces strikingly different results 
since now migrant status has no effect.  Controlling for the place of residence, migrants appear 
similar to their ‘non-migrant’ counterparts.  Second, place (province or department) of residence 
at birth effects are included instead.  Now, migrant status has a significant positive effect of a 
larger magnitude than that estimated by OLS.  Controlling for birthplace, migrants fare 
significantly better than their ‘non-migrant’ counterparts.  Based on an estimated coefficient of 
0.2300, migrants earn on average 1.259 time what ‘non-migrants’ earn. 
Finally, one must acknowledge the potential self-selection bias of including only individuals 
currently employed (for a positive wage or salary).  This may lead the returns to migration to be 
biased and is easily corrected for using standard Heckman techniques.  This is done in table 6.  
The probability of working for pay (either by self- or wage-employment) is identified using the 
presence of young children in the household (ages 0 to 4 and ages 5 to 15), since young children 
are more likely to affect labour market participation than earnings.  Table 6 provides the results of 
the first stage in the first column.  The individual level variables are consistent with intuition: 
migrants, males, and individuals with more education are more likely working, an effect 
increasing at a decreasing rate with age.  The presence of young children increases participation 
as it increases the number of dependents for whom to provide.  The second stage results are 
presented in the second column.  Comparing these results to the uncorrected OLS results in table 
5, we find that controlling for selectivity in the labour market does not change our results.  While 





  16The migration decision 
Table 7 provides the results of estimating the probability of migration.  Since migration is a 
binary choice variable, the models estimated and presented in the table is a variant of equation 
(2): 
( ) i i v M + = = α Zi 1 ob Pr      ( 2 ’ )  
where  is the probability that the individual migrates.  We estimate this model 
using binary choice models such as the probit and logit. 
( 1 ob Pr = i M )
The first two columns provide the probit results for the migration decision.  The first includes 
the instrument.  Of the individual characteristics, the only variables that predict migration is 
whether the individual currently resides in a rural area.  The household characteristics fare better 
than the individual characteristics in the migration decision in terms of statistical significance.   
Of the household occupational dummy variables, farm wage-employment activities are 
negatively related to the decision to migrate while non-farm wage-employment is positively so.  
This is to be anticipated if we consider that households engaged in wage farming may not be 
sufficiently wealthy to ‘afford’ the migration costs.  However, if this interpretation is true, then 
we would expect that credit availability at the birth place would alleviate the migration costs and 
would increase the proportion of individuals moving.  Yet, what we observe is the opposite.  
Another interpretation of the negative coefficient on farm wage-employment is that people (and 
entire households) are migrating away from rural areas (recall table 1), thus reducing the 
proportion of individuals (and households) engaged in farming.  This is corroborated by the 
positive coefficient on whether the household engages in non-farm wage-employment: rural 
individuals migrate to the cities precisely because they are looking for (and obtaining) a more 
lucrative non-farm wage job replacing their previous, subsistence, farming job.   
One of the most interesting findings of this exercise is the statistical significance of our 
variable of access to credit at the place of birth.  We find that this variable has a statistically 
  17significant and negative effect on the probability of migration.
20  If we believe that this variable is 
picking up access to credit at the time of migration, then our results suggest that borrowing 
constraints, rather than acting as a deterrent, are an incentive to migrate: credit constraints may be 
interpreted as indicating the lack of opportunities.  These results suggest that credit access is not 
related to migration via the costs of migration.  Rather, access to credit becomes a motivating 
factor.  We will turn our attention in what follows on the determinants of access to credit as a 
function of migration to validate or refute this interpretation. 
Finally, the instrument (the expected relative pay-off to migration) is a statistically significant 
and positive predictor of migration:  the higher the average earnings of individuals who have 
migrated from my birthplace relative to the average earnings in my birthplace, the more likely I 
can interpret this as a signal that I may experience a similar return if I move, thus increasing my 
probability of migration.  The second column repeats the analysis by excluding the instrument 
from the probit estimation.  The Hausman test for the excluded variable is statistically 
insignificant, failing to reject that the model which includes the instrument is inconsistent.
21
To check whether the results obtained in column (1) are sensitive to the error structure 
imposed by the probit model, equation (2’) is also estimated with the logit model as well as the 
linear probability model.  The results (presented in table 7, columns (3) and (4) respectively) are 
generally consistent with the probit estimates.  This suggests that the migration decision results 
are robust to the empirical model chosen. 
 
Access to Credit 
We now turn our attention to the reverse causal direction between migration and credit.  
There are two alternative scenarios explaining how migration may affect credit.  First, migrants 
                                                 
20 In fact, we also ran the same regressions including also current access to credit for the individual (results 
not shown here), and found that current access to credit was insignificant. 
21 Note also the magnitude of the standard error relative to the estimated coefficient. 
 
  18might have better access to credit because they are a positively self-selected group and what 
makes them successful migrant also makes them successful in obtaining credit.  We would then 
expect a positive effect of migrant status on access to credit.  However, our previous analysis of 
the determinants of migration (table 7) showed that none of the typical individual variables (such 
as education) was a predictive of migration behaviour.  Second, and conversely, we might think 
that migration worsens the probability of obtaining credit: moving often means that social ties are 
cut and lenders in the migrants current area of residence have less information about the potential 
borrower’s credit history and relative risk.  Worswick (1999) finds evidence that recent 
immigrants to Canada are more likely to be credit constrained than their native born Canadian 
counterparts.  Extrapolating to our case, we would expect internal migrant status to have a 
negative effect on access to credit.   
The results from a probit model (presented in table 8) of access to credit support the second 
scenario: migrant have less access to credit than non-migrants.  In addition, table 8 presents the 
results from multinomial estimation of access to credit by source, to see whether migration status 
has a differential effect on where individuals find sources of credit.  The last three columns of the 
table provide the determinants of obtaining credit from a bank, a cooperative or ‘financiera’, or 
from a business, relative to obtaining credit from an individual.  The multinomial logit results 
show that migrants are more likely to obtain credit from a cooperative or a business than from 
other individuals than non-migrants.  The likely interpretation of this effect is that, in support of 
the second scenario above, migrants have cut social ties with their original communities and thus 
are less likely to find ‘informal’ sources of credit because members of their new communities 
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Table 9 provides the results of the estimation of equation (3).  Column (1) repeats the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1) originally presented in table 5.  Column (2) 
presents the Two Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable (2SLS-IV) results. The two models 
estimate very similar coefficients on all control variables other than migration.  The migration 
dummy (instrumented with the expected relative returns) becomes statistically insignificant.  The 
interpretation of this surprising result is that the returns to migration are soaked up by the 
observable characteristics causing the individual to migrate.  This could be related to a selective 
migration story.  Recall that not all individuals whose relative expected return is greater than one 
( 1 ≥ bi Y ) migrate (see table 3 and the discussion of table 3 in section 3).  It is possible that 
individuals who are able to perceive the potential returns because of some innate characteristic 
(say ‘ability’) will choose to migrate.  This innate ability could also be related to the individual’s 
ability to earn a higher wage.  In other words, there is an unobserved characteristic (innate ability) 
that is positively correlated with both the decision (and ability) to migrate and their labour market 
performance.  While the 2SLS estimates an insignificant migration effect, the Hausman tests fails 
to reject that OLS is the more consistent estimator for the regression of equation (3).   
 
5 MATCHING METHODS 
The measure of the returns to migration generated from the use of standard instrumental 
variable and self-selection techniques depends heavily on the notion that the migrant (treatment) 
and stayer (control) groups share common supports for the distribution of individual 
characteristics.  That is, individuals in the respective groups are comparable across a range of 
characteristics, such as age, gender and education.  However, if these characteristics differ 
significantly, in that the density function of the distribution of characteristics do not share 
common supports, then standard non-experimental self-selection corrections techniques can lead 
  20to inaccurate assessments of the effects of migration (Heckman et al, 1996).  This is due to the 
fact that standard non-experimental techniques rely on the strong assumption that there is a 
common effect across all individuals in the treatment group.  But it could be the case that the 
treatment group may respond differently to the treatment, given its differing characteristics.  For 
example, the treatment group may consist of young, well-educated individuals with high access to 
credit, while the control group may be older, poorly educated individuals operating their own 
businesses in rural areas.  Consequently, the effect of migration may differ substantially between 
migrants and stayers, thus biasing standard selection model results.  
More formally, a treatment effects model estimates the difference, γ , between migrants 
and stayers as: 
  ) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 = − = = M Y E M Y E γ                     (4) 
where Y1 is earnings in the migration state, Y0 is earnings in the stayer state, and M = 1 indicates 
the individual migrated and M = 0 indicates the individual stayed.  But one needs to calculate the 
effect of the treatment (migration) on the treated (those who migrated):    
                                   ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 = − = = M Y E M Y E T γ                     (5)      
That is, the valid comparison is the outcome of those individuals that migrated to a group of 
individuals that are otherwise identical, except for the fact that they did not migrate (but could 
migrate).  Unfortunately, most data sets do not contain the second term of the right hand side of 
(5), since it is not observed.
22  
A potential solution to the problem of assessing the effects of migration, given significant 
differences between migrants and stayers, is to create the counterfactual   by  ) 1 | ( 0 = M Y E
                                                 
22 A solution is for the researcher to create the right hand side of (5) through the implementation of a 
randomized experiment: individuals would be randomly relocated and compared to stayers.   This would 
create a true control group sample analogue that could be used to determine the difference between the 
outcomes of migrants and the outcomes of stayers.  While the implementation of randomized experiments 
has been successfully executed in certain settings, evaluation techniques of this sort would be simply 
inappropriate A large literature has evolved around the use of randomized experiments to evaluate job 
training programs. See Heckman et al (1999) for a complete survey. 
  21matching migrants and stayers along observable characteristics.   For every individual who 
migrates, one needs to find an individual that is identical in every respect except for the act of 
migration.  For instance, if the migrant group consisted of young, urban-based and highly 
educated individuals, one would like to find similarly educated individuals from the same cohort 
and location.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) propose a solution to this problem, known as 
“matching methods.” Instead of matching along individual characteristics X, one can match along 
P(X), the probability that the individual migrated.  In this way, one can generate consistent and 
unbiased estimates of the effect of migration on migrants.
23           
The limitation of utilizing the propensity score as a measure of “comparability” is determined 
by the availability of sufficient conditioning variables.  If the decision to migrate is poorly 
estimated, the treatment and control groups will be poorly matched.   In this way, the bias caused 
by selection on unobservables can be accentuated by the matching process (Smith and Todd, 
2001).  Given these considerations, we propose to report the results from the application of 
matching methods in addition to the standard descriptive statistics and regression results. 
Matching methods are a useful tool to assess the validity of the results generated by the non-
experimental techniques utilized in section 2 and reported in section 4.  The first step is to 
determine whether the sample of migrants and stayers exhibit covariate “imbalance”.  That is, are 
the two groups comparable in terms of the observable X’s.  Table 10 presents t-statistics and 
standardized differences for the unmatched migrant and stayer groups.  As can be readily seen, 
there are considerable differences between the two groups.  For instance, the standardized 
differences typically exceed twenty percent and simple t-statistic tests reveal that along most 
dimensions, the migrant group is statistically different than the control group. 
                                                 
23 See Smith and Todd (2001) and Ham, Li and Reagan (2003) for a thorough discussion of matching 
method techniques. 
 
  22Table 11 presents results from implementing nearest neighbour matching techniques with 
replacement.
24  The propensity score is estimated with a probit regression using the same set of 
regressors as reported in Table 7, column (1).   The results are striking.  Comparing the earnings 
between migrants and stayers for the un-matched sample suggests that migrants had substantially 
higher earnings than stayers.  However, implementation of simple nearest neighbour matching 
indicates that the difference between migrant and stayer earnings is insignificantly different than 
zero, as shown by the 95% confidence interval of the difference in earnings.  This is true when 
the number of nearest neighbours is varied from 1 to 10, common supports are imposed, and the 
density is trimmed.  Similarly, Table 12 checks the robustness of these results by implementing 
local linear regression matching.  Again, there appears to be no significant difference in the 
earnings of migrants versus stayers.   
These results differ from those using OLS and 2SLS.  In section 4, we estimated a positive 
and significant migration effect.  Correcting for endogeneity, the 2SLS results found no migration 
effect, though we could not rule out that the OLS results were more consistent than the 2SLS.  In 
fact, the 2SLS standard error on the migration coefficient becomes very large, leading to a very 
imprecisely estimated coefficient.  While our instrument appears to satisfy the requirements for 
an instrumental variable, it is still possible that it is a weak one.  Similarly, the results from 
propensity score matching suggest that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
earnings between migrants and stayers. 
Our analysis suggests that the returns to migration results are sensitive to the chosen 
estimation method.  Naturally, this raises the question as to which model provides the most 
                                                 
24 First, run a probit regression to generate P(X), the propensity to migrate.  Then, sort the data according to 
the estimate of P(X) from highest to lowest.  For each individual in the migrant group match it to an 
individual in the stayer group, in descending order and repeat until each migrant is matched with a stayer 
from the control group.  Individuals from the treatment and control group that do not have a “nearest 
neighbour” are excluded from the sample, while some control individuals may act as the control for more 
than one treatment individual.  Then, the earnings outcome is compared between the treatment group 
individuals, and the newly selected control group individuals.  The exercise is repeated for the average of 
the closest three, five and 10 nearest neighbours. 
  23reasonable estimate of the treatment effect of migration.  The OLS estimates cannot be 
immediately ruled out, since the Hausman test failed to reject that OLS is the more consistent 
estimator with respect to 2SLS.  Furthermore, while the matching method and 2SLS results 
suggest that the effects of migration are statistically zero, their respective confidence intervals 
encompass the point estimate from OLS estimation, even despite the improved precision of the 
matching estimator.  Nevertheless, the statistical and intuitive properties of our 2SLS instrument 
suggest that endogeneity is indeed a problem, and therefore 2SLS estimates are appropriate in this 
setting.  Similarly, the large degree of covariate imbalance augurs for a matching methods 
approach.  Confidence in the implementation of this technique is confirmed by the strong probit 
results regarding estimation of the propensity to migrate.  In both cases, the results are consistent 
with the notion that migration in of itself does not contribute to higher earnings for migrants.  The 
OLS estimates, therefore, can be viewed in the following way: the reported positive effects of the 
migration dummy do not necessarily represent the return to migration, but rather, reflect the fact 
that those individuals who choose to migrate are predisposed towards higher earnings in general.  
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence presented here finds that the returns to migration are positive, until we control 
for individual and household characteristics and for endogeneity: estimation by 2SLS and 
matching methods suggests that migration itself does not contribute to higher earnings.  Access to 
credit has an ambiguous predicted effect on migration, and this ambiguity is substantiated by the 
failure to find a statistically significant coefficient either on the migration decision to migrate or 
on labour market earnings.  Meanwhile, migration seems to have a significant effect on access to 
credit.  In particular, migrants are less likely to have access to credit, but those that do are more 
likely to borrow from cooperatives and businesses than from more informal sources – we attribute 
this effect to the loss of social ties on the part of the borrower and reduced credit history 
information on the part of the lenders.  
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Table 1 - Means of direction of migration and sources of credit 




Number of Observations 3295 708 2587
Direction of Migration (% of Migrants)
Rural to Rural 5.40 44.07 6.88
Rural to Urban 39.70 0.00 50.56
Urban to Rural 3.07 0.00 3.90
Urban to Urban 30.35 55.93 38.65
Rural to Metropolitan Lima-Callao 22.21 0.00 28.30
Urban to Metropolitan Lima-Callao 17.78 0.00 21.49
Reason First Left Birth Place (%)
More Income 6.86 6.07 7.07
Employment 22.70 32.63 19.98
Education 17.45 19.21 16.97
M a r r i a g e 6 . 4 65 . 7 96 . 6 5
Terrorism 0.15 0.14 0.15
Other 46.37 36.16 49.17
Source: Authors' own calculations from 1991 PLSS  
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Number of Observations 2436 1551 885 403 482
Individual Characteristics
H a s  m i g r a t e d  a t  l e a s t  o n c e 0 . 3 6 0111
Works for pay 0.55 0.49 0.65 0.67 0.63
Log Individual Earnings (If working only) 6.49 6.32 6.71 6.44 6.95
A g e 3 7 3 54 03 84 2
Gender (Male=1) 0.49 0.47 0.53 0.59 0.47
Marital Status (Married=1) 0.45 0.42 0.50 0.46 0.53
Language Spoken by Household Head is Indigenous 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.07
Years of Education 7.20 6.82 7.86 8.04 7.71
Currently Resides in Rural Area 0.47 0.57 0.29 0.52 0.10
Currently Resides in Metropolitan Lima 0.19 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.46
Is Non-Farm Self-Employed 0.25 0.21 0.34 0.31 0.36
Is Farm Self-Employed 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.02
Is Farm Wage-Employed 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.04
Is Non-Farm Wage-Employed 0.18 0.13 0.26 0.24 0.28
Born in Rural Area 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.56
Migrated Rural to Rural 0.01 0 0.04 0 0.07
Migrated Rural to Urban 0.10 0 0.26 0 0.48
Migrated Urban to Rural 0.00 0 0.01 0 0.02
Migrated Urban to Urban 0.08 0 0.23 0 0.42
Years Since Migration (Migrants only) 17.94 0 17.94 11.79 23.09
Household Characteristics
Log Per Capita Household Earnings 5.67 5.46 6.06 5.76 6.30
Household Size 5.81 5.83 5.76 5.59 5.89
Average Household Years of Schooling 7.27 6.80 8.08 7.57 8.51
% of Household Members who have Migrated at Least Once 0.36 0.15 0.72 0.72 0.72
Household Engages in Non-Farm Self-Employment 0.53 0.48 0.61 0.59 0.62
Household Engages in Farm Self-Employment 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.05
Household Engages in Farm Wage-Employment 0.36 0.44 0.21 0.29 0.09
Household Engages in Non-Farm Wage-Employment 0.46 0.39 0.59 0.35 0.67
Household has Access to Credit 0.138 0.123 0.163 0.191 0.139
% of Households in Birth Place with Access to Credit 0.138 0.128 0.155 0.171 0.142
Source(%):
Individual 54.86 54.97 54.86 66.23 41.79
Bank 11.81 16.75 11.81 14.29 8.96
Cooperative, 'Financiera' 9.72 7.85 9.72 5.19 14.93
Business 23.61 20.42 23.61 14.29 34.33
Banca Paralela 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: The sample size of migrants is smaller than in Table 1 because this table only includes observations with complete data for all variables.  We include in this table only 
those whose birth place is included in the sample, with all observations (except for the income and years since migration) non-missing. Source: Authors' own calculations 
from 1991 PLSS  
 
Table 3 - Instrument for migration - Anticipated (or expected) earnings 
Migrate 55 (16.7%) 261 (24.6%)
Stay 274 (83.3%) 743 (75.4%)
Number of Observations 329 (100%) 1004 (100%)
1 ≤ bi Y 1 > bi Y
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Table 4 - Descriptive statistics for variables used in regressions 
Means Standard 
Error
Min Value Max Value
Number of Observations
Individual Characteristics
Log Individual Earnings (from all sources) 6.489 1.235 1.386 11.657
Has Migrated and Settled 0.227 0.419 0 1
Age 37.837 13.983 16 81
Gender (Male=1) 0.653 0.476 0 1
Marital Status (Married=1) 0.519 0.500 0 1
Years of Education 7.770 4.806 0 19
Currently Resides in Metropolitan Lima 0.196 0.397 0 1
Born in Rural Area 0.583 0.493 0 1
Household Characteristics
Household has Access to Credit 0.140 0.347 0 1
% of Households in Birth Place with Access to Credit 0.145 0.106 0 0.364
Average Years of Education of Household members (aged 15+) 7.499 3.717 0 16.667
Household Size 5.653 2.441 1 16
Household Engages in Non-Farm Self-Employment 0.632 0.483 0 1
Household Engages in Farm Self-Employment 0.107 0.309 0 1
Household Engages in Farm Wage-Employment 0.350 0.477 0 1
Household Engages in Non-Farm Wage-Employment 0.508 0.500 0 1
Instrument
Ybi 1.828 1.304 0.299 6.598
Source: Authors' own calculations from 1991 PLSS
1333 observations with non-missing variables (except for the income variable).  
Settled migrants whose birth place is not included in the PLSS are excluded.
1333
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Table 5 - Raw OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable
Individual Characteristics
Has Migrated and Settled 0.1591** -0.0268 0.2300***
(0.081) (0.133) (0.094)
Age 0.0764*** 0.0713*** 0.0720***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Age Squared -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender (Male=1) 0.5380*** 0.4911*** 0.4772***
(0.078) (0.064) (0.064)
Marital Status (Married=1) 0.0555 0.1145* 0.1042
(0.074) (0.066) (0.066)
Years of Education 0.0652** 0.0504** 0.0566**
(0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
Years of Education Squared -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural -0.5512*** -- -0.3531**
(0.093) -- (0.141)
Household Characteristics
% of Households in Birth Place with Access to Credit 0.2538 0.7478 --
(0.344) (0.676) --
Average Years of Education of Household members (aged 15+) 0.0231 0.0244 0.0219
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Household Size -0.0118 -0.0215* -0.0206*
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
Household Engages in Non-Farm Self-Employment 0.0903 0.1163 0.1187
(0.081) (0.074) (0.073)
Household Engages in Farm Self-Employment 0.2963** 0.2481** 0.2627**
(0.127) (0.105) (0.103)
Household Engages in Farm Wage-Employment -0.3454*** -0.2485*** -0.2402***
(0.095) (0.088) (0.087)
Household Engages in Non-Farm Wage-Employment -0.0030 0.0443 0.0536
(0.076) (0.070) (0.069)




Within Group R-Squared 0.1584 0.2116
Between Group R-Squared 0.6402 0.7399
Overall R-Squared 0.2440 0.2858
F-Statistic 17.18*** 24.75***
Source: Authors' own calculations from 1991 PLSS
Only individuals who are earning positive incomes.  1333 observations.  OLS regressions are weighted by the household size and the standard
error (in brackets) are Huber-White corrected.  ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%. *: significant at 1%
Log of Individual Earnings
Fixed Effects for 
Current Place of 
residence
OLS
Fixed Effects for 














Age Squared -0.0018*** -0.0008***
(0.000) (0.000)
Gender (Male=1) 1.1253*** 0.5752***
(0.072) (0.095)
Marital Status (Married=1) 0.1318* 0.0597
(0.077) (0.073)
Years of Education 0.0474* 0.0667**
(0.028) (0.028)





% of Households in Birth Place with Access to Credit 0.7087** 0.2789
(0.360) (0.345)
Average Years of Education of Household members (aged 15+) -0.0575*** 0.0212
(0.017) (0.018)
Household Size -0.1577*** -0.0141
(0.020) (0.014)
Household Engages in Non-Farm Self-Employment 1.0029*** 0.1191
(0.082) (0.083)
Household Engages in Farm Self-Employment 0.0803 0.2982**
(0.129) (0.125)
Household Engages in Farm Wage-Employment 0.6549*** -0.3276***
(0.098) (0.099)
Household Engages in Non-Farm Wage-Employment 0.4588*** -0.0220
(0.076) (0.075)
Number of children in the household aged 0 to 4 years 0.1914***
(0.043)












2(1) test of independence across equations 
Source: Authors' own calculations from 1991 PLSS
Only individuals who are earning positive incomes. Regressions are weighted by the household size and the standard














(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual Characteristics
Age 0.0238 0.0278 0.0389 0.0069*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.033) (0.004)
Age Squared -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender (Male=1) -0.0500 -0.0394 -0.0799 -0.0053
(0.097) (0.095) (0.168) (0.023)
Marital Status (Married=1) 0.1595 0.1248 0.2997* 0.0413*
(0.100) (0.097) (0.173) (0.023)
Years of Education -0.0262 -0.0372 -0.0656 -0.0024
(0.038) (0.037) (0.067) (0.009)
Years of Education Squared 0.0005 0.0014 0.0019 -0.0001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000)
Rural -1.2671*** -1.2107*** -2.4667*** -0.2787***
(0.148) (0.143) (0.299) (0.031)
Household Characteristics
% of Households in Birth Place with Access to Credit -1.3740*** -2.4785*** -2.2581** -0.3357***
(0.514) (0.482) (0.912) (0.112)
Average Years of Education of Household members (aged 15+) 0.0290 0.0145 0.0412 0.0082
(0.023) (0.022) (0.041) (0.005)
Household Size 0.0123 0.0175 0.0056 0.0008
(0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.004)
Household Engages in Non-Farm Self-Employment 0.0471 0.0645 0.0618 0.0044
(0.110) (0.108) (0.192) (0.025)
Household Engages in Farm Self-Employment 0.0930 0.0455 0.0790 0.0038
(0.176) (0.174) (0.337) (0.036)
Household Engages in Farm Wage-Employment -0.4224*** -0.4097*** -0.9390*** -0.0819***
(0.146) (0.143) (0.284) (0.030)
Household Engages in Non-Farm Wage-Employment 0.4900*** 0.4474*** 0.8594*** 0.1130***
(0.107) (0.103) (0.192) (0.024)
Instrument
Ybi 0.2526*** 0.4810*** 0.0624***
(0.039) (0.073) (0.009)
Constant Term -1.7940*** -1.1550*** -2.8617*** -0.0076
(0.456) (0.437) (0.811) (0.103)
Pseudo R-Squared [Adjusted R-Squared] 0.2519 0.2226 0.2603 [0.2253]
LR Chi-Squared [F-Statistic] 359.36*** 317.49*** 371.31*** [26.82***]
Hausman Test for the instrument
Source: Authors' own calculations from 1991 PLSS. Only individuals who are earning positive incomes.  1333 observations. Standard errors (in brackets) are Huber-White 






  32Table 8 – Access to Credit 
Dependent Variable








Log Individual Income 0.0156 0.3669 0.4645 0.1407
(0.042) (0.290) (0.302) (0.177)
Has Migrated and Settled -0.1927* 0.1599 1.4223* 1.6989***
(0.116) (0.999) (0.756) (0.532)
Age 0.0110 0.1842 0.0912 -0.0398
(0.019) (0.118) (0.152) (0.101)
Age Squared -0.0001 -0.0023 -0.0015 0.0002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Gender (Male=1) -0.1925* -0.5796 -0.5491 -0.4410
(0.099) (0.682) (0.580) (0.427)
Marital Status (Married=1) -0.0464 -1.6062** -0.9523 -0.4555
(0.100) (0.751) (0.705) (0.502)
Years of Education 0.0188 -0.1938 0.3961 0.3907
(0.041) (0.249) (0.304) (0.288)
Years of Education Squared -0.0002 0.0124 -0.0218 -0.0284*
(0.002) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Rural -0.1615 -0.0008 0.0609 -0.3251
(0.147) (0.815) (0.779) (0.688)
Household Characteristics
Average Years of Education of Household members (aged 15+) 0.0644 0.3820** 0.0624 0.4048***
(0.024) (0.158) (0.158) (0.137)
Household Size 0.0578*** 0.5786*** 0.3119*** 0.2048**
(0.018) (0.120) (0.113) (0.086)
Household Engages in Non-Farm Self-Employment 0.1205 -1.1830 0.5150 0.9686*
(0.112) (1.041) (0.752) (0.549)
Household Engages in Farm Self-Employment 0.5611*** 2.0357** -32.4307*** 0.9722
(0.148) (1.034) (0.650) (0.790)
Household Engages in Farm Wage-Employment -0.0059 2.6034*** 1.2812* 1.3742*
(0.138) (0.907) (0.720) (0.764)
Household Engages in Non-Farm Wage-Employment -0.1294 -2.9609*** -0.1899 -0.1113
(0.099) (0.721) (0.655) (0.607)
Constant -2.1962*** -12.3028*** -9.8977*** -7.2120**
(0.492) (3.389) (3.564) (3.334)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0799
LR Chi-Squared  75.82***
N 1333
Source: Authors' own calculations from 1991 PLSS. Only individuals who are earning positive incomes. Standard errors (in brackets) are Huber-White corrected.  
11704.71***
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Table 9 - 2SLS-IV estimates versus OLS estimates  
Dependent Variable
Individual Characteristics




Age Squared -0.0008*** -0.0008***
(0.000) (0.000)
Gender (Male=1) 0.5380*** 0.5406***
(0.078) (0.079)
Marital Status (Married=1) 0.0555 0.0706
(0.074) (0.077)
Years of Education 0.0652** 0.0647**
(0.028) (0.029)





% of Households in Birth Place with Access to Credit 0.2538 0.0441
(0.344) (0.403)
Average Years of Education of Household members (aged 15+) 0.0231 0.0242
(0.018) (0.018)
Household Size -0.0118 -0.0100
(0.015) (0.015)
Household Engages in Non-Farm Self-Employment 0.0903 0.1007
(0.081) (0.082)
Household Engages in Farm Self-Employment 0.2963** 0.3072**
(0.127) (0.130)
Household Engages in Farm Wage-Employment -0.3454*** -0.3720***
(0.095) (0.106)
Household Engages in Non-Farm Wage-Employment -0.0030 0.0134
(0.076) (0.095)





Source: Authors' own calculations from 1991 PLSS. Only individuals who are earning positive incomes.  1333 observations.  OLS 
regressions are weighted by the household size and the standard error (in brackets) are Huber-White corrected.  ***: significant at 
1%, **: significant at 5%. *: significant at 1%
1.07
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Age 39.5 36.6 20.39 3.67
Gender (Male=1) 0.68 0.63 9.68 1.75
Marital Status (Married=1) 0.55 0.50 10.14 1.83
Years of Education 8.5 7.2 27.34 4.97
Rural 0.28 0.54 54.58 9.80
Household Characteristics
 % Household has Access to Credit 16.0 13.3 25.01 4.51
Average Years of Education 8.3 6.9 36.21 6.54
Household Size 5.8 5.6 4.38 1.37
Household Engages in Non-Farm Self-Employment 0.70 0.58 24.43 4.40
Household Engages in Farm Self-Employment 0.10 0.11 2.93 0.90
Household Engages in Farm Wage-Employment 0.23 0.44 46.82 8.36
Household Engages in Non-Farm Wage-Employment 0.63 0.42 43.22 7.80
+: The standardized difference in percent is the mean difference as a percentage of the average standard deviation: 100(x1-x2)/[(s12-s22)]/2 where 
each variable x1 and x2 are the sample means in the treated group and the control group and s12 and s22 are the corresponding sample variances.  
Standard differences and Two Sided T-Statistics are presented in absolute values. 'Source: Authors' own calculations from 1991 PLSS. N=1333.
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Un-Matched Data 6.71 6.32 0.39 0.25, 0.52
Nearest Neighbor Matching
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 1 )  6.71 6.77 -0.06 -0.27, 0.15
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 3 )  6.71 6.73 -0.02 -0.20, 0.16
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 5 )  6.71 6.75 -0.04 -0.20, 0.12
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 10 )  6.71 6.78 -0.07 -0.22, 0.08
Nearest Neighbor Matching, Common Supports
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 1 ) 6.67 6.73 -0.05 -0.26, 0.15
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 3 ) 6.67 6.69 -0.02 -0.19,0.15
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 5 ) 6.67 6.72 -0.05 -0.20, 0.11
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 10 ) 6.67 6.74 -0.07 -0.21, 0.07
Nearest Neighbor Matching, Common Supports,             
Trimming (0.02)
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 1 ) 6.70 6.76 -0.06 -0.26, 0.14
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 3 ) 6.70 6.72 -0.02 -0.19, 0.15
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 5 ) 6.70 6.74 -0.04 -0.20, 0.11
  Nearest Neighbor ( n = 10 )  6.70 6.77 -0.07 -0.22, 0.08
Log Earnings
Source: Authors' own calculations from 1991 PLSS.  Nearest Neighbour macthing methods implemented.  n is the number of neighbors used to 
calculate the control group average outcome.  Common support indicates thast treatment observations with propensity scores greater (less) than the 
maximum (minimum) propenisty score for controls are dropped.  Trimming eliminates 2% of the obersvations of the treatment group at the lowest 
segment of teh density of control group observations.  
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Un-Matched Data 6.71 6.32 0.39 0.25, 0.52
  
LLR 6.71 6.75 -0.04 -0.19, 0.11
LLR,  Common Supports 6.67 6.72 -0.05 -0.19, 0.09
LLR,  Common Supports, Trimmimg (0.02) 6.70 6.75 -0.05 -0.18, 0.09
LLR,  Common Supports, Trimmimg (0.02), Bandwidth (0.06) 6.70 6.75 -0.05 -0.18, 0.09
LLR,  Common Supports, Trimmimg (0.02), Bandwidth (0.08) 6.70 6.75 -0.05 -0.19, 0.09
LLR,  Common Supports, Trimmimg (0.02), Bandwidth (0.10) 6.70 6.75 -0.05 -0.19, 0.09
Log Earnings
Source: Authors' own calculations from 1991 PLSS.  Local Linear Regression (LLR) macthing methods implemented.  Common support indicates thast 
treatment observations with propensity scores greater (less) than the maximum (minimum) propenisty score for controls are dropped.  Trimming 
eliminates 2% of the obersvations of the treatment group at the lowest segment of the density of control group observations.  Bandwidth indicates 
varaiation in the bandwidth of the LLR.
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